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RHMFSS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY

RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

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SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI

NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,

NILSSON, FRIEDT

OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)

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TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE RS XG

SUBJECT: OSCE: 1/27 FSC RESPONSES TO RUSSIA ON COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

REF: A. STATE 4427

1B. USOSCE 0018

11. (SBU) Summary: In response to Russia's insistence for clarification on why its proposed European Security Treaty (EST) cannot be discussed separately ("sectorally") from the Corfu Process or the human and economic dimensions, all interventions by participating States (pS) supported comprehensive, cross-dimensional engagement on issues that impact the OSCE area. Belarus was the lone exception. UK noted the EST went beyond "hard security" and entered the realm of security "principles" that necessitated a comprehensive approach within the Corfu Process. Russia was not &satisfied8 with the responses, but welcomed the open exchange of views as a significant achievement for the Forum for Security Cooperation. The presence of several ambassadors who normally do not attend the FSC and the unified messages that &hard security8 was only one aspect of the overall Corfu Process discussions on European security bodes well for upcoming negotiations. Other issues discussed included Denmark's proposal for developing a Vienna Document-plus mechanism, and the Greek proposal for a Small Arms Light Weapons Plan of Action. A request for guidance regarding Russia's intention to discuss a crisis management and conflict resolution draft decision in Working Group "B" is in Para 19 below. End summary.

Strategic Dialogue: Russia's wants "sectoral" approach for EST

12. (SBU) The Russian Chief Delegate to the FSC (Ulyanov) opened the 1/27 Forum for Security Cooperation discussion repeating assertions made the previous week (Reftel). Ulyanov accused "the West" of attempting to dilute the Russian initiative for a European Security Treaty (EST) by not supporting a dialogue on "hard security" issues separate from the Corfu Process. He asked the pS if there really was a different conceptual approach to European Security. Ulyanov insisted comprehensive security was core to Russia's Foreign Policy doctrine, that Russia had worked to help

establish the concept in the 1970s, and that in was both inappropriate and unjustified to suggest Russia's proposal for a European Security Treaty was not aligned with this approach. He pledged Russia's support to work actively in all three dimensions, "including the Corfu Process."

¶3. (SBU) Russia argued that the most urgent problems were in the hard security basket, and the EST was aimed at remedying the imbalance among the three OSCE dimensions*political military, human, and economic/environmental*to achieve better implementation of the comprehensive approach. Russia complained that the OSCE has given most of its attention to decisions on human rights and elections while simultaneously according the political-military issues a "Cinderella status." Russia said it was really one question: "can we have accords in specific security dimensions or can there only be a comprehensive agreement?" Russia believes that "sectoral agreements are admissible and justified, and have shown their merits through history.⁸

¶4. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that the reverse logic could call into question the legitimacy of agreements and conventions that were focused on only the human dimension, like those of the Council of Europe. "These were not comprehensive," Ulyanov accused, adding "In this sense the CFE treaty would also be inappropriate." Acknowledging that the logic could be taken to the "realm of the absurd," Ulyanov reiterated the idea of a new treaty in the "hard security" arena is legitimate and has precedence (e.g., CFE, START, and the Open Skies Treaty).

¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov recognized that the parallelism to the arms control treaties was inexact, but Russia was interested in

USOSCE 00000028 002 OF 005

procedure. He noted the Vienna Document did not impose limits on arms but ventured into a broader range of political military issues including on budgets and transparency, yet no one accused the Vienna Document of being not in line with a comprehensive approach to security. Russia wanted to know why some pS were arguing for a different approach for the EST. In summation, Ulyanov said though security is comprehensive, attention should be given to consolidate efforts in each of the dimensions, and it was only logical to pay greater attention to "hard security" where the situation was most deplorable. He argued there was every reason to strive for agreement on specific, sectoral issues; "like Kyoto, the draft EST is valid in its own right." Russia believed agreement on sectoral issues not only strengthened one but all dimensions.

UK lays out illogic of Russia's approach

¶6. (SBU) With the exception of Belarus, which made a fairly weak intervention in support of Russia, pS gave a strong response in favor of dealing with the Russian draft treaty as a contribution to the much larger debate on European security in the Corfu Process, while still acknowledging Russian concerns which had led it to propose the draft. They promised to give serious consideration to Russia's proposed EST in this process, noting that &hard security⁸ is only one element of the broader dialogue, and argued for the primacy of the comprehensive approach. Fifteen delegations made interventions on the Russian questions. The UK (Cliff) gave an eloquent intervention, rejecting the assumption that the political military dimension was relegated to "Cinderella status" within OSCE. Expressing concern about the roll-back of human dimension issues within the OSCE space, the UK said attention to these issues did not detract from the "pillars of the Political-Military dimension like CFE, which along with Vienna Document and Open Skies were about the nuts and bolts of arms control⁸ and an important base for European Security.

¶7. (SBU) The UK also countered the Russian argument for a hard security "sectoral" approach to the proposed EST, noting the Russian initiative did not address size of forces or

military equipment, but principles that must be examined within the framework of the long-standing, comprehensive values of the OSCE. The UK said the fundamental principle of the Russian initiative that a party must not affect the security interest of another party, was a cross-dimensional issue. For example, the UK noted that territorial integrity and independence were equally important to the right to join alliances of one's choosing. Crises in the Balkans, Transnistria, and the Caucasus were linked to questions of free expression of human and political, especially minority, rights. In Central Asia issues concern human and religious rights, and two winters' past, Europe was to dealing with energy issues that could have triggered security-related problems. Finally, the UK noted that the rise of trans-national threats, like terrorism and criminality make it impossible to look at broad European Security principles solely in terms of "hard security."

E pluribus, Unum

¶8. (SBU) France (Gonzalez) put the Russian initiative within the context of the Helsinki Final Act, the 35-year evolution of new threats in Europe, and the special relevance of the Corfu Process including the progress already made to enhance existing conflict prevention mechanisms. France said the EST would have meaning only within the Corfu Process framework in support of a genuinely shared security community.

¶9. (SBU) Germany (Genrich) assured Russia it would look at

USOSCE 00000028 003 OF 005

the proposed EST with great care, especially individual components that could be built into the Corfu Process. Germany expressed appreciation for Russia providing substance and an impetus to give more attention to improving mutual understanding. This entailed going forward with what the OSCE provides: an approach on comprehensive security that ensured forward momentum to modernize existing mechanisms, including democracy, rule of law, and fundamental freedoms. Germany said there should be no limitation for engaging on thematic mechanisms for consultation and conciliation, and the Corfu Process provided the ingredients for consensus and did not exclude specific military elements.

¶10. (SBU) The U.S. (Charge Fuller) said the U.S. was &open to discussing all proposals for enhancing European security in the context of the Corfu Process,⁸ including Russia's proposed European Security Treaty. She reiterated U.S. support for the Ministerial Declaration on European Security approved in Athens, the concept of comprehensive, cooperative, and individual security, the need for full implementation of our commitments in all three OSCE dimensions, and the primacy of effective multilateralism. She also reiterated the principles of territorial integrity, the right of countries to choose their security arrangements, and host country consent for military deployments. The U.S. also noted the link between peace and security, and the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being for all peoples. Fuller pointed out that the OSCE comprehensive security approach provided the most effective tools for fortifying States and enhancing their ability to adapt peacefully to changing political conditions And asserted that the OSCE is the most appropriate venue for discussion about European security, including Arms Control and CSMBs and Russia's proposed EST.

¶11. (SBU) Poland (Grudzinski) gave one of the most pointed responses. He expressed concern that the proposed EST would weaken the role and effectiveness of existing structures like NATO and EU, as well as reestablish &spheres of influence⁸ and prevent pS from joining the alliance of their choice. Poland said that OSCE pS should aim to reconfirm existing norms and enhance them when and as necessary, adding "We want OSCE-plus not minus." The Netherlands (Kleinjan) expressed concern over the timing and choice of forum for the Russian EST initiative because it was distributed during the more

comprehensive security exercise within the Corfu Process, which in turn was developed to engage directly on concerns raised by Russia. Turkey (Begec) noted the need to give equal attention to all three security dimensions, and pledged to examine the merits of all proposals put forward on strengthening European Security. This did not mean, however, that Turkey wanted to see each of the three security elements in every proposal, but was prepared to discuss the EST in terms of its contribution to the overall comprehensive approach.

¶12. (SBU) Belgium (Van de Velde) noted Russia's focus on hard security and interstate relations was not in line with the real threats to security that are more transnational than state-centric. Latvia's intervention echoed Belgium's. Romania (Feruta) said the Russian initiative for an EST required careful study for its political and legal implications. Romania believes the Corfu Process addresses Russia's concerns, adding that the problem is not one of lacking principles, but full compliance with the norms in all three dimensions; "we must revitalize our commitments, not replace them." Austria, Switzerland, Greece and Kazakhstan (the current Chairman-in-Office) gave varying notes on the theme of support for the Corfu Process and the need to address the EST proposal in a cross-dimensional and comprehensive manner.

USOSCE 00000028 004 OF 005

Russia rebuts

¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov Russia responded that although he did not agree with everyone's input, he believed that the engagement and discussion of the issue clearly demonstrated progress "from the wall of silence Russia used to receive two, three years ago." He referred to the plenary discussion as a major achievement. Ulyanov added he was not &satisfied8 with the answers to the question of how the sectoral approach preferred by Russia relates to the comprehensive approach advocated in the Forum. He noted that Russia was still waiting for replies from capitals to President Medvedev's letter on the EST so it can correlate and analyze any inputs in order to see how to proceed with the EST proposal. Ulyanov "insisted" on the validity of the view that the political-military dimension has not been given equal attention to the human dimension over the last decade. Russia seeks to remedy the imbalance. Russia wants respect for its proposed EST to be judged on its own values and not linked to other problems. Russia favors addressing cross-dimensional issues, but not everything needs to be put into a single basket, Ulyanov noted, adding somewhat illogically that there was no link between EST and climate change, for example. He concluded that there was sufficient reason to continue the dialogue.

¶14. Comment: The pS were very polite in saying they will study the proposed EST, that they consider it a contribution to the Corfu Process, and welcoming Russia's clarification of its position. They then joined forces to reaffirm the concept of comprehensive security and the need to consider cross-dimensional aspects of security and not segregate them into &hard8 and &soft8 security. A number of ambassadors who don't normally attend the FSC participated in order to reaffirm this message. This unity of message bodes well for the upcoming Corfu Process discussions.

Any Other Business

¶15. (SBU) Spain (Anson) gave an update on the Dayton Article V Committee including the information exchange and reports on supplementary inspections. France is next to take the chair. The update will be attached to the Journal of the Day. Bulgaria (Iliev) briefed on the Seventh Annual Consultation on Black Sea CSBMs. Romania assumes the Chair in 2010. The report will be attached to the Journal of the Day. Austria (Eischer) will circulate an updated questionnaire of the

April 15 exchange under the Code of Conduct, and asked that the issue be placed on the agenda for Working Group "A."

¶16. (SBU) Denmark (Peterson) briefed on the distribution of its Food-for-Thought to establish a new procedure for updating Vienna Document 1999 (FSC.DEL/9/10). Noting a "changed attitude" towards addressing VD99, Denmark has offered a mechanism that does not open the document for wholesale review, and facilitate the incorporation of targeted changes into the regime (called "VD-plus"). Denmark would like to begin discussion in two weeks (2/10). Russia (Ulyanov) announced it has recommended Moscow to support the Danish proposal for VD-plus, as "worthwhile, meriting further study." Ulyanov did lay down a marker that the timeline for the Danish proposal does not change the urgency to update VD99 this year.

Working Group "A" - Digital Cameras and SALW

¶17. (SBU) Turkey reintroduced its proposal to extend usage of digital cameras in Vienna Document application (FSC.DEL/124/09/Rev. 1). The UK, Germany, France, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Austria all made statements in

USOSCE 00000028 005 OF 005

support of the Turkish proposal. The Greek Chair (Sourani) asked if the draft could be moved to plenary. The U.S. (Ellis) noted it was not prepared to agree to move the Turkish proposal out of WG "A." The proposal will remain on the agenda for the next meeting. Following the meeting, the UK (Hartnell) approached U.S. del to note concern that the U.S. continued to stall finalization of the proposed draft decision on digital cameras, and that the current state of affairs, if continued, would likely suffocate the proposal.

¶18. (SBU) Greece (Kalpadakis) introduced its Food-for-Thought paper on developing a Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW; FSC.DEL/213/09). The UK (Hartnell) and Germany (Risse) supported the Greek paper. The U.S. (Ellis) gave a general overview of those elements it could support (e.g., stockpile destruction/security assistance, UN GGE brokering controls, implementation of UN International Tracing Instrument) and those it would oppose (e.g., expanding scope of current OSCE Document on SALW, new mechanisms/agencies, additional norms regulations or reporting mechanisms). Greece explained its philosophy was to cover the broadest possible scope of suggestions, recognizing the ambitious character of some specific elements. Sweden announced an Informal Friends of SALW Working Group would meet on 2/29 for a detailed exchange of views.

RFG

¶19. (SBU) The next FSC Plenary and Meeting of Working Groups "B" and "A" will be held on February 3. Col Wolfgang Richter of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs will be the feature speaker focusing on Vienna Document and other related CSBMs under the Security Dialogue. Russia plans to present its draft paper on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management (FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1) in WG "B"; unless instructed otherwise, USDEL will argue a point of order, rejecting the application for an FSC decision on an issue (Russia's joint FSC-PC proposal for a draft decision) that is simultaneously before the PC for a separate decision (Russia introduced the proposal in the 791st PC on 1/21). Per ref a guidance, USDEL will note that due to the cross-dimensional character of crisis management, this topic should be discussed in the context of the FSC Security Dialogue.

FULLER